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BRENDAN F. BROWN t
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS COMPLETED THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE STOIC CONCEPT OF THE NATURAL LAW INTO
THAT OF AN ENACTMENT OF A PERSONAL LAWGIVER WITH
WILL AND REASON
St. Thomas has defined law as "an ordinance of reason for the common
good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated. '"' :
Law is essentially an ordering principle of the practical, as distinguished
from the speculative, reason.2 Although reason is one faculty, that aspect
of it which is confronted principally with ends and means is called
practical. Speculative reason has mainly to do with cause and effect.3
Law is an external principle which measures and guides actions to
the good and restrains them from evil.4 It is an efficient means toward
the good.' This end is common to the group or community. 6
Law is a dictate of reason in the ruler of a perfect community by
whom his subjects are governed.7 Its source must be found in a personal
lawgiver, either Divine or human, who has a reason and a will. This
lawgiver must have the authority to formulate the law because of his
* Presented to the Philosophy Club of Loyola University of the South, New Orleans,
Louisiana, March 4, 1956, to commemorate the feast day of St. Thomas Aquinas.
t A.B. (1921), LL.B. (1924), Creighton University; LL.M. (1925), J.U.B. (1926),
J.U.L. (1926), J.U.D. (1927), Catholic University of America; D. Phil. in Law.
Oxford University (1932); Professor of Law, Loyola University of the South, New
Orleans, La.
1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-I, q. 90, art. 4, concl. The translation used is the First
Complete American Edition in three volumes, 1947, literally translated by the
Father of the English Dominican Province.
2 Id., I-II, q. 91, art. 3, concl.
3 WU, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 17 (1955).
4 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 92, art. 2, concl.
5 Id., I-II, q. 92, art. 1, ad 1.
6 Id., I-I, q. 90, art. 2, concl.
7 Id., I-I, q. 90, art. 3, concl.
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superior relation to those for whom the law
is intended.8 In one respect, law is in the
lawgiver who rules and measures, but in
another sense, it is in those who are subject
to the law. 9
Law must be promulgated or communi-
cated to those upon whom it is to be bind-
ing. This may be done through reason,
enlightened by faith, as in the case of divine
positive law.' 0 Again, law may be promul-
gated through reason unenlightened by
faith as in the instance of natural law.
11
According to St. Thomas, all law origi-
nates in the lex aeterna, or eternal law. 12
This law is the fountainhead of the moral
and physical orders. It is the timeless divine
plan of government which wisely directs all
actions and movements toward their ap-
pointed ends. It rules and measures all
things in the whole community of the uni-
verse.
13
The eternal law is the primary analogue
so that all other types of law are only lim-
ited participations in it. They are derived
from the eternal law to the extent to which
they share in right reason.' 4 One type of
law is distinguishable from another by the
precise manner in which it shares in such
reason.
15
St. Thomas locates the natural law within
the framework of the eternal law. His cele-
brated definition is that the natural law is
"the rational creature's participation of the
eternal law.' 6 It is the immutable law of
8 Id., I-II, q. 90, art. 3, ad 2.
9 Id., I-I, q. 90, art. 3, ad 1.
10 Id., I-II, q. 91, art. 4, concl.; q. 98, art. 2, concl.
11 Id., I-II, q. 90, art. 4, ad 1.
12 Id., I-IL, q. 93, art. 3, concl.
13 Id., I-IL, q. 93, art. 1, concl.
14 Id., I-IL, q. 93, art. 3, concl.
15 Ibid.
16 Id., I-1I, q. 91, art. 2, concl.
human nature. It proceeds immediately
from human reason, but ultimately from
God.17 It is that part of the eternal law
which relates only to the actions of human
beings.18 Man participates in the eternal
law by recognizing which actions are right
and which are wrong.
The supreme law is eternal as existing in
God. It is known as the natural law as it
exists in men. Hence the eternal law is the
cause of the natural law. But the latter
comes first in the order of human knowl-
edge. 19 While the eternal law transcends
the world, the natural law rules from
within. In the case of man, it does this by
the rule of reason. Natural law is only an
imprint of the eternal law on man's natural
reason.20
St. Thomas described the hierarchy of
moral values of the natural law. The first
principle is that of the practical reason,
founded on the concept of good, namely,
that to which all men tend. All norms of
the natural law, therefore, are based on the
first precept that good is to be done and evil
avoided. 21 This most fundamental precept
of the natural law, namely, that man must
live in accordance with his rational nature
so as to do good and avoid evil, is evident
to all. 22 Manifest deductions, such as the
precepts of the Decalogue, can easily be de-
duced by reason. Remote conclusions are
reached only after study and considerable
reasoning. 23 But the more fundamental
principles of the natural law are knowable
17 Id., I-II, q. 93, art. 2, concl.
18 Id., I-II, q. 91, art. 2, concl.
19 Id., I-I, q. 90, art. 4, ad 1; I, q. 32, art. 1, concl.
20 Id., I-II, q. 91, art. 2, concl.
21 Id., I-IL, q. 94, art. 2, concl.
22 Ibid.
23 Id., I-II, q. 93, art. 2, concl.; q. 94, art. 2, concl;
q. 94, art. 4, concl.
proximately through the conscience.
Natural law is truly law. 24 It is an ordi-
nance for the common good of man. It has
been promulgated in his intellect by Him
Who has the care of the universe.
While animals and matter must obey the
eternal law, because that is the way they
are made, man may refuse to follow it be-
cause he has been given the power of free
moral choice. 25 But if he disobeys it, he
violates the essential constitution of his na-
ture and rebels against the will and reason
of the Creator. Man thus becomes incapable
of reaching his final end.
Greek philosophers had reached a primi-
tive notion of the natural law as embodied
in the expression jus naturale.26 They had
observed the recurring phenomena of na-
ture about them, and everywhere they had
beheld a maintenance or ordering prin-
ciple. They concluded that such a principle
was also necessary for human society if
cosmos therein was to be attained and
anarchy avoided.
27
The ordering principle of the universe
was called jus because it was law which was
discovered or perceived by the individual
person. Unlike lex, it was not man-made.
It was called naturale because it was or-
dained by nature, and hence beyond the
reach of caprice and human will.2 8
The concept of the jus naturale was a
most important contribution to rational sci-
ence, postulating, as it did, the existence of
an eternal and immutable body of objective
principles of moral right and wrong. It
24 Id., I-II, q. 91, art. 2, concl.
25 Id., I-II, q. 93, art. 6, concl.
26 See Brown, Natural Law and the Law-Making
Function in American Jurisprudence, 15 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 9 (1939).
2T Ibid.
28 Ibid.
3 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1957
justified a doctrine of inalienable rights and
was conducive to the dignity of the human
personality. It exerted great influence in
shaping the destiny of the Roman law,:be-
ginning approximately in the third century,
B.C.
2 9
But the genius of the Stoics was incapa-
ble of solving the difficult problems of the
source of this law, its consequences, and its
full implications. This was to be expected
since they did not have the benefit of divine
positive law. Hence many of them believed
that the jus naturale was derived from na-
ture in the sense of a pantheistic universe.
Many were of the opinion that it was a law
of instinct, identical with that which moves
non-rational creation.
The concept of the natural law was not
fully developed even in the period between
the Stoics and St. Thomas. Even at the time
of Justinian, in the sixth century, A.D., ap-
proximately, when Christianity was exert-
ing wide influence in Rome, the distinction
between the eternal law and the natural
law, and between animal instinct and hu-
man reason, was not clearly understood.
Thus in the Institutes of Justinian, the natu-
ral law is amorphously defined as "that
which nature has taught to all animals, for
this law is not peculiar to the human race,
but applies to all creatures which originate
in the air, or the earth, and in the sea."30
It remained for the Angelic Doctor to
make the full, final transformation of the
rudimentary Stoic concept of the jus natu-
rale into the lex naturalis, or the divine en-
actment of a Personal Lawgiver. In doing
this, he clarified the meaning of the writ-
ings of St. Albert the Great and St. Isidore
29 Brown & Cormack, The Stoic Philosophy and
the Roman Law, 16 BULLETTINO D'ISTITUTo Di
DIRITTo ROMANO 451-58 (1937).
30 INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Book I, Title II.
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of Seville, and worked them into an origi-
nal synthesis so as to carry forward the
tradition of natural law philosophy to its
highest possible pinnacle of development,
consistent with the political and sociologi-
cal experience of the thirteenth century.3 1
This tradition enjoyed universal acceptance
throughout Christendom until the sixteenth
century. It then had to compete with a
philosophy which detached human law from
both divine positive law and objective natu-
ral law.
ST. THOMAS PERFECTED THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE RELATION
OF THE NATURAL LAW TO THE JUS
GENTIUM AND THE JUS CIVILE
St. Thomas placed special emphasis upon
human positive law in formulating his bril-
liant synthesis of legal theory. He has de-
scribed human law in terms of its relation
to the natural law. He postulates that
"every human law has just so much of the
nature of law, as it is derived from the law
of nature."'32 He wrote that "it is from the
precepts of the natural law, as from general
and indemonstrable principles, that the hu-
man reason needs to proceed to the more
particular determinations of certain mat-
ters." 33 These determinations, devised by
human reason, are called human laws, pro-
vided the other essential conditions of law
are observed.34 These conditions demand
that the law be ordained to the common
good. It must be made by the whole people,
31 James, Some Historical Aspects of St. Thomas'
Treatment of the Natural Law, 24 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL As-
SOCIATION 147 (1950).
32 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-H, q. 95, art. 2, concl.
33 Id., I-II, q. 91, art. 3, concl.
34 Ibid.
or their public representatives who have
rightful authority over them. Moreover, it
must be promulgated.
Human law is necessary for man. It is
essential for the proper direction of the
community and for the attainment of the
common good. Human lawmakers must re-
inforce the primary and necessary conclu-
sions of the natural law, because otherwise
some men might not be sufficiently aware
of them, or else inclined to disobey. 35 An
example would be the criminal law which
forbids murder. Secondly, these lawmakers
are obliged to decide upon certain rules
which the natural law leaves undetermined,
as for example, the precise type of capital
punishment. 36 Changing sociological fac-
tors will affect their determination.
An enactment contrary to the natural law
is not law.3 7 The force of a law depends
upon the extent of its justice. This in turn
is determined by the law's reasonableness:
".. . [T]he first rule of reason is the law of
nature." ' Unjust enactments do not bind
in conscience. An enactment will be con-
trary to the natural law if it is not ordained
to the common good, or if the lawmaker
exceeds his legislative authority, or if the
burden of the law is not properly distributed
among the people.39 But prudence may dic-
tate obedience to certain types of unjust law
to avoid public disturbance.4 0 Manifestly,
St. Thomas had in mind an unjust law
which took away a person's right to do the
thing forbidden, but did not oblige him to
do something intrinsically wrong. 41
35 Id., I-II, q. 95, art. 1, concl.
36 Id., I-II, q. 95, art. 2, concl.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Id., I-LI, q. 96, art. 4, concl.
40 Ibid.
41 See Foreword by Brown, DEL VECCHIO, PHIL-
OSOPHY OF LAW XVI (1953). "
Essentially, human law is variable and
not universal. This is so because it deals
with contingent and varying facts. 42 De-
tailed determinations must be more or less
proportionate to their ends, but are neither
absolutely right or wrong in themselves.4'
Human law may be divided according to
several classifications. Thus it may be either
civil or state law (jus civile) or the law
of nations (jus gentium) according to the
two ways in which the law is derived from
the natural law.44 The law of nations is the
result of the necessary conclusions of the
natural law. Civil law, as such, arises as a
determination of certain generalities .4 5
St. Thomas utilized the concepts of such
legal philosophers as Aristotle, Cicero, and
Isidore of Seville, and such Roman jurists
as Gaius and Ulpian, in perfecting the
knowledge of the relation of the natural law
to the jus gentium and the jus civile. Ac-
cording to St. Thomas, the jus gentium is
not natural law although it is natural to
man as man, and although its conclusions
are not very remote from the principles of
the natural law. 46 The jus gentium is hu-
man positive law because it is only man's
attempted implementation of the conclu-
sions of the natural law which are necessary
for man as a social animal. 47 The imple-
mentation may be by widespread usage and
practice. But the method of conforming to
the conclusions of the natural law varies
over the centuries, as for example the pre-
cise laws governing commercial transactions
of sale and the like.
42 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-l1, q. 97, art. 1, concl.
and ad 2.
43 Id., I-I, q. 97, art. 1, concl. and ad 1, 2.
44 Id., I-II, q. 95, art. 4, concl.
45 Ibid.
46 Id., I-II, q. 95, art. 4, ad 1.
47 ld., I-II, q. 95, art. 4, concl.
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Manifestly, the jus civile, in its strict and
proper sense, is not natural law. Here St.
Thomas was not referring to civil or state
law in its larger meaning of a complete
body of national social control, for this
would include civil law not only in the
Thomistic sense, but also national natural
law itself insofar as the positive law had
failed to clothe the primary dictates of the
natural law with legal sanction. But in the
narrow Thomistic sense, civil law is that
rather arbitrary part of state law which
each people decides is best for itself, and
appropriate and effective for its unique
needs.48
Civil law in the Thomistic sense consists
only in ad hoc determinations of general
norms which flow from the natural law.
49
It has only the force of human law. It may
consist of positive law applicable to a
group, or it may confer privileges upon
certain individuals in special situations, or
it may be the judicial application of com-
mon laws.50 Reasonable men may disagree
as to what is just in detailed, particular
situations.
Thus St. Thomas clarified the position of
Gaius who had maintained that the jus gen-
tium was a part of the jus naturale, because
.it was universally applied and was not the
result of human opinion. 51 Actually the jus
gentiurn was not in force among all peo-
ples, but only among those who were civi-
lized. But even though the jus gentium was
not in effect among certain peoples, yet the
lex naturalis imposed duties upon all na-
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 James, Some Historical Aspects of St. Thomas'
Treatment of the Natural Law, 24 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL As-
SOCIATION 147-49 (1950).
51 Id. at 150-51, 155-56.
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tions. Thus St. Thomas interpreted the
apparent prior divergencies of concept on
this subject as different ways of looking at
the same thing.52
It should be noted that the jus gentium,
as understood in ancient and medieval
times, was not synonymous with interna-
tional law as now understood. In maintain-
ing that the jus gentium was not natural
law, St. Thomas was not referring to what
was later known as international law, be-
ginning with Suarez and Grotius. In this
latter sense, international law, though
founded on the analogy of the jus gentium,
does include both natural international law
and positive international law.53
History vindicates the Thomistic con-
cept of the jus gentium. Prior to this law
which emerged in about the third century,
B.C., the Roman legal system, then called
the jus civile, was restricted in its applica-
tion to certain human beings on the basis
of race, creed and civil status. Foreign trad-
ers were without legal remedies. Rome had
three choices. It might make the jus civile
available to foreigners. It might exclude
them from the country, and thus cut off its
foreign trade and lose the enjoyment of
imported commodities and the profits oc-
curring from exports. Finally, Rome might
build a legal order which would capture
the essential ingredients of those legal sys-
tems prevailing in the countries from which
the foreigners came. Rome chose the third
course.
5 4
The common denominator of the legal
52 Id. at 151.
53 Brown, The Natural Law as the Moral Basis of
International Justice, 22 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY 335 (1956); also printed in 120 CONG. REC.
A1985 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1956).
54 POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRU-
DENCE 5 (5th ed. 1943).
systems of the peoples, living in the Medi-
terranean basin, came to be applied in a
new court whenever there was a dispute
between foreigners, or between a foreigner
and a Roman citizen. This new law was
known as the jus gentium. It consisted of
positive law determined by the common le-
gal denominator found in nearby legal sys-
tems. It was administered by Roman
praetors in Roman courts.5 5 As St. Thomas
rightly maintained, it was human law, and
not a part of the natural law.
THE THOMISTIC CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM AND EQUITY MAY BE RE-
LATED TO THE ROMAN AND AN.
GLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS
According to St. Thomas, human law
must be changed whenever it becomes ob-
solete, i.e. unsuitable for the achievement
of its proper object in the light of new
sociological facts.5 6 Human ingenuity may
discover more effective means for the im-
plementation of the primary norms of the
natural law. Again, lawmakers iay make
better determinations, or choices, in the
discretionary area of human law. They
may discover more successful ways of car-
rying out the mandate of those principles
of human law, which stem from the neces-
sary premises of the natural law.57 Legal
institutions are at first imperfect and may
be improved.
But St. Thomas warns that law should
be altered only for the common good. The
benefit resulting from a change in a just
law must be great and evident.5 s Of course,
the advantage would be obvious if the new
55 Ibid.
56 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 1-II, q. 97, art. 1, concl.
57 Ibid.
58 Id., I-I, q. 97, art. 2, concl.
enactment superseded an unjust law, or
eliminated an extremely harmful observ-
ance. But to abrogate a just law without
due cause may be to shake the tradition of
obedience which has been built up among
the people with regard to that law. When
a change in the law is contemplated, the
advantage to the common good must out-
weigh the detriment resulting from a dimi-
nution of the binding power of the legal
order.5
Human law may be changed by legisla-
tion, custom, or equity. Legislation is an
extrinsic and deliberate changing of the law
by an act of the lawgiver. The law is ex-
pressly altered or repealed. The legislation
takes effect at a specified time.
Custom results from a repetition of ex-
ternal acts, evidencing acquiescence on the
part of the lawmaker. Custom may obtain
the force of human law, as well as inter-
pret and abrogate it. 60 But it may not abol-
ish the primary principles of the natural
law, or divine positive law."' Custom de-
rives its power from the fact that the au-
thority of the people to make law is greater
than that of the sovereign, who represents
them. It expresses the legislative will of the
people. Force is lent to the custom insofar
as the lawmaker tolerates it.62 Custom re-
flects the deliberate judgment of many rea-
sonable men, if it is just.
Equity may change the law intrinsically,
for example, by a method of interpretation
of an express law, or by applying the natu-
ral law in cases of first impression in the
judicial process. Lawmakers legislate for
general situations, and for typical, abstract,
59 Ibid.
1;0 Id., I-It, q. 97, art. 3, concl.
61 Id., 1-I1, q. 97, art. 3, ad 2.
62 Ibid.
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future events.63 They are unable to antici-
pate every possible case that may arise.
Hence judges must have an area of discre-
tion in the adjudication of certain cases.
As a matter of equity in a broad sense,
the proper authorities may dispense from
human law, if by so doing, they benefit the
common good.64 If a precept is not for the
common good, when applied to a certain
person, or a particular set of circumstances,
then the lawgiver may decide that the law
is not applicable. 5 It is not merely a matter
of respect for the persons involved, there-
fore, when special treatment is accorded. '
It is significant that St. Thomas does not
refer to fiction as a mode of changing law.
This method was rather frequently em-
ployed in the primitive stages of law when
men erroneously believed that all law was
immutable, contrary to the teachings of St.
Thomas. The fiction consisted in pretend-
ing that the facts of a particular situation
were different from what they actually
were, in order to reach a certain result
without changing the law.
The Roman and Anglo-American legal
systems reached maturity because they fol-
lowed the methods which the natural law
prescribed for change, as explained by
Thomas Aquinas. These were the only two
systems of national law which were able
to develop into bodies of social control,
capable of worldwide regulation and gen-
eral application. The Canon Law of the
Church also succeeded in doing this be-
cause it closely followed the natural law,
and had the additional advantage of the
wisdom of the divine positive law.
Custom contributed much to infusing
63 Id., I-It, q. 120, art. 1, concl.
G4 Id., 1-11, q. 97, art. 4, concl.
65 Ibid.
"16 Id., 1-I, q. 97, art. 4, ad 2.
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natural law into the Roman and English
laws. Indeed as late as the third century,
A.D., custom was still accorded a large
share in the formulation of Roman law.
The customs of local communities were not
abrogated even by the decree of the Em-
peror Caracalla, in the year 212, when the
Roman law became the official law of the
Empire.67 Custom had the force of law
because it rested on the recurring recogni-
tion of the authority of the natural law and
right reason.
Custom perhaps played an even more
important role in English, than in Roman,
legal history in integrating positive law and
morals. Thus, lex, or imperative law, and
jus, or traditional law which produced cus-
tom, were considered together in the works
of Glanvill and Bracton, two celebrated
English jurists of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, respectively.6 s They were much
preoccupied with customary law, as well as
later English jurists. The whole Law Mer-
chant, which Lord Mansfield absorbed into
the English Common Law in the eighteenth
century, was founded on mercantile custom
over the centuries.6 9
Equity transformed the Roman and
English laws into world systems. Before the
impact of equity, these systems were on the
road to decay. They were morally sterile.
They could not adjust themselves to the
newly rising problems of justice which soci-
ety created. They resisted change.
Equity compelled the creation of new
courts, with new procedures, the Court of
67 RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 79-80 (1927).
68 Lex and Jus appear in the titles of their princi-
ple works. Bracton's great book was entitled DE
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBus ANGLIAE. Glanvill's
monumental work was TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET
CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIAE.
69 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
568-72 (1931).
the Praetor Peregrinus, in Rome, and the
Court of Chancery in England. In these
courts, the positive law was again placed in
proper relation to the natural law. Positive
law again became a means toward an end.
The individual person was recognized as
the unit upon which the legal order oper-
ated, rather than arbitrary classes of men.
Positive law resulted which premised an
objective body of moral principles. These
were applicable to all men everywhere. "Ad-
herence to these principles is the secret of
the survival of the Roman law, with all its
civil law derivatives, and of the Anglo-
American legal system.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS HAS PRO-
FOUNDLY AFFECTED THE COURSE
OF JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE
PAST SEVEN CENTURIES
The genius of St. Thomas reached its
highest point of creative power in its ca-
pacity to communicate order to what
seemed to be chaos. He synthesized what
was apparently contradictory and irrecon-
cilable. This always followed an exhaustive
analysis of the facts of the problem at hand.
By his synthesis of natural law with the
eternal law, and with positive law, both di-
vine and human, he set in motion one of
the two great parallel lines of juridical
development. Modern legal science began
in the twelfth century with the revival of
the study of Roman law in the newly
founded European universities, such as
Bologna. Thereafter this science advanced
in two ways, first, by the analytical method,
and secondly, by that of scholastic natural
law.7A The former was sponsored by the
70 POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRU-
DENCE 6-7 (5th ed. 1943).
lawyers, and the latter by the philosophical
jurist-theologians. These were the school-
men. The greatest of them all was St.
Thomas Aquinas.
The superiority of the natural law
method over the analytical is manifest.
The analytical approach postulated the su-
premacy of all temporal authority in any
particular community. It was primarily
concerned with human positive law as an
end in itself.
The analytical activity consisted in mak-
ing notes or commentaries, marginal and
interlinear, on the texts of the Roman or
civil law, such as the Corpus Juris Civilis of
Justinian. These notes clarified the meaning
of difficult words or obscure passages. These
notes or glosses were compiled, arranged
and classified. But no attempt was made to
evaluate them in the light of reason or jus-
tice. Accursius was perhaps the most fa-
mous Glossator. 7' He was to the analytical
technique what St. Thomas was to the
natural law method. Accursius is just a
name to the legal historian. But the writings.
of St. Thomas have endured as a living
force in the administration of justice.
St. Thomas conclusively demonstrated
that the true philosophy of the natural law
could reconcile lex and jus. In the thir-
teenth century and thereafter, the late im-
perial Roman idea, which found expression
in codification, imposed the duty on every
political ruler to make law. This idea com-
peted with the English concept that the
sovereign must rule under God and the
law. This concept was emphasized by Brac-
ton, the father of the English Common
71 2 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
146 (1936).
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Law.7 2 St. Thomas demonstrated that there
was no conflict between these two legal
theories. The state was subordinate to the
natural law, which was the foundation of
jus, but not to the positive law, which it
made. But the state is not exempt from the
directive force of just positive law. It is the
duty of the state to fulfill the law on its own
free initiative. If the state makes law which
is actually just and for the common good,
this lex will reinforce rather than destroy
jus.
In conclusion, the Thomistic concept of
the natural law avoids both a jurisprudence
of conceptions and an uninhibited philoso-
phy of utility. St. Thomas rejected a psy-
chological relativism which would admit of
no objective norms of right and wrong. He
repudiated the theory that all ideas a per-
son may hold have cosmic validity. At the
same time, he accords a reasonable weight
to the useful and the practical. Jhering, one
of the founders of the Sociological School
of Jurisprudence, in the second edition of
his classic-book, Der Zweck im Recht, or
Law as a Means to an End, published in
1886, stated with regard to St. Thomas:
Now that I have come to know this vigor-
ous thinker,'I can not help asking myself
how it was possible that truths such as he
has taught should have been so completely
forgotten among our Protestant scholars.
What errors could have been avoided if peo-
ple had kept these doctrines! . . . For my
part, if I had know them earlier, I probably
would not have written my whole book; for
the fundamental ideas which I have treated
here are found expressed in full clarity and
in a convincing manner by this powerful
thinker.
72 Id. at 252-56.
